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**Volume No.3 Issue No.3 September 2014**

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THE INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH JOURNAL "INTERNATIONAL RESEACHERS"

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# THE BURDEN OF THE COLONIAL STATE SYSTEM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The central tenet of this paper lies on explicating the pitfalls of state building in the Horn of Africa. In line with this, the main thesis of the paper focuses on elaborating the necessity for revisiting African pre-colonial interconnections in lieu of sticking with the colonial state model that empowers territorial space over people's consent. Thus, this paper explains the problems triggered by the adoption of territorial state, the primary designator and foundation for social identity, which was superimposed by colonial powers during their circumscription experiment over the peoples of Horn of Africa.

**Keywords:** Africa, Colonialism, Institution, Territorial State.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The term 'Horn of Africa' is ambiguous, fluid and shifting. Nonetheless, it retains validity and remains in use referring to the geographical region which is embraced within the horn shaped part of Africa. It designates the area that projects into the Indian Ocean from the content's land mass in North East Africa (Farer, 1976:47). Some scholars identify it in narrower sense denoting only Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia (Anand , 1977:153) and some others include Kenya, the two Sudanese Republics, Uganda and commonly referred it as the Greater Horn of Africa (Sisay, 2009:19). For the purposes of this paper, Horn of Africa (H0A) refers only the core states.

The states in the H0A are linguistically and ethnically linked evincing a complex pattern of interrelationships and trans-state ethnic sharing on top of sharing similar physical space. Therefore, there has been a strong cultural synthesis and population mixing in the region. For instance, the Somalis are the majority in Somalia, Djibouti and in the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia. Afars are also significant proportion of the population of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Shinn and Thomas, 2004). They have inhabited in the Horn of Africa for centuries in the area commonly referred as Afar triangle, divided among Ethiopia Eritrea, and Djibouti.

The people of the trans-märäb region also shares deep rooted and umbilicaly anchored connections (Alemseged, 1998:2). We found Tigrean brothers and Kunama minorities residing on both in Ethiopia and Eritrea. This ethnic and linguistic sharing signals the existence of collective memories in the region. The following table summarizes how such collective social identities were fragmented in to nationalist enclave among the states in the region.

| County | Ethnic Groups | Religion |
|--------|---------------|----------|
| Dibouti | Issa-Somali (60%)<br> Afar (35%)<br>French (3%)<br>Yemeni, Ethiopians, Italians and others (2%) | Islam (94%) and Christianity (6%) |
| Eritrea | Tigrinya (50%)<br>Tigre and Kunama (40%)<br>Afar (4%)<br>Saho(3%)<br>Others(3%) | Islam, Orthodox Christianity Protestant and Roman Catholic |
| Ethiopia | Oromo (40%)<br>Amhara (30%)<br>Sidamo(9%)<br>Tigray (5%) | Islam, Orthodox Tewahido Christianity, Protestant and Roman Catholic, Animist and others |

| | Gumuz(6%)<br>Somali (6%)<br>Afar (4%)<br>Gurage (2 %)<br>Others (1%) | |
|---|---|---|
| Somali | Somali (85%), Bantu and others (15%) | Sunni Muslims |
| Sudanese Republics | Ja'aliyyin, Baggara and others (45%), Beja(10%) Dinka(8%), Nuba(6%), Nuer(4%), Zande(1.8%) Shiluk(1.6%), Bari (1.3%), Nubians( 0.5 %), Others (17%) | Islam (70%), Christianity (6.3%), Traditional (15-20%) |

Table 1. Ethnic and religious Diversity in the Horn; Source (Sisay Assefa, Challenges to Peace and Sustainable Development in the Horn of Africa: Case of Ethiopia: Journal of the Horn of Africa, Vol. 27, 2009; P.162)


## 2. OBLITERATION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORIES IN THE HORN

In the post-colonial period, historical narratives about the Horn of Africa (HoA) were predominantly territorial nationalism centric. The exclusionist colonial physical space and social space produced by elites of the region intensified otherness instead of promoting shared traits that could stick the peoples together for common end (Othman, 1974:272; Bahru 2002:300; Markakis and Nega, 1986). In short, historical discussions about the region were substantially geographical in the sense that the consideration of social, political and economic processes have been trapped in geographical assumptions (Agnew 1995:379).

According to Clapham (2002), the determination of social space and identity using territory appears to be very recent conception (Clapham, 2002:28). In the HoA spatial territory begins to serve as a designator of identity since the advent of colonial state. Along with primordial ethnic concerns, it has been used for re-constituting a political imbalance among political elitists (Royce, 1982:83). As the result of these two processes, territorial nationalism that grossly assumes all inhabitants of a particular territorial space as sharing homogenous social identity and mutual commitment has evolved (Peter, 2004:487). Therefore, the rise of territorial identity has overshadowed discussions about the shared cultural traits shaped by either historic or natural phenomena. Moreover, instead of examining the processes that brought about the crisis, most scholars focus on conflict (Crummey, 2003:119) and poverty analysis vis a vis with 'embattled identities (Bahru 2008:362-373) with a sovereign state setting that neglects the pre-colonial intertwined pacific interactions and interdependence among the peoples beyond the delimited or the demarcated boundaries. But this nationalistic approach of historical narrative about the peoples of the region that neglects then impact of the state system as an institution is nowadays challenged by few regionalist head starts aspiring for the rectification of the neglected portion of the Horn's veritable and rich past (Moussa, 38-45).

Ali Moussa and Donald Crummy are some of the articulators of the regionalist approach and aspire for creating shared destiny among the peoples of the HOA through the eventual dissociation of sovereignties. In describing the causes that infuse barricades of interstate interconnections, both of them criticizes the betrayal committed by the intelligentsia against their own society in the production of historical, cultural and political knowledge with a general tone of regret and exigency(Cummey, 118 and 129; Moussa, 38-45).While Donald Crummy condemned the political elites for the dysfunctioning of the states of the horn, Moussa stick to the 'trahison of des clercs'- the treason of the intellectuals, as causative for pervasive spatial identity claims of the society as follows:

> …we as intellectuals have generally failed to challenge the [territory] centric views of our societies and to preserve a specific space or role which could have permitted us to participate in the development of our communities (Moussa, 35).

However, Moussa couldn't provide us an alternative pre-colonial history of the Horn or a means that liberates the mind tricked by elite's and colonization of the mind. Therefore, as its stated by Moussa, the contingency of forming preference in a community moves parallel to the knowledge production and dissemination usually spear headed by elites but yet most of them convey political interest imbedded in it. This shows the systematic distortion of facts, information and production of wronged alternatives either by politicizing or de-politicizing history and human identity. Thought Moussa championed all new beginnings in his new vision, which aspires for creating shared past and common future among the peoples of Horn, but he failed to show the objective realities about the pre-colonial social setting of Horn of Africa by deconstructing the didactic subjective territory centric interpretations inherited from colonial mind set.

Similarly, Gunther (2003:346) attempted to redraw the post-colonial map of the Horn of Africa in a fashion of 'new wall out of the old bricks.' But, he couldn't come up with a map of pluralized and globalized Horn which serves as single home land for all. Thus, he failed in the trap of re-territoralization (Ibid). Clapham has also follows his suit at micro level using center-periphery dictum in his critique about the spatial construction of Ethiopian state (Clapham, 9 in Wendy *et al*, 2002). Crummy suggested the production of knowledge that can connect ruptured interconnections in pluralized association of sovereignties. The practical steps and purification of history from ab-uses is smartly articulated by Frederrica Guazzini (2003:11). This exposition prescribes the production, reproduction and dissemination of a truly free, ethical and socially worthy historical knowledge capable of educating the new generation about the culture of inclusion and appreciation of difference (Ibid). However, elite driven politicization of history and human identity continued to play its role and the way out for re-storing links among the societies of the horn remain untouched.

Hence, these scholars didn't frame the Horn of Africa as a common home land of its peoples by dissociating the colonial constructs. Due to entrenched elitism native scholars also barely contribute for such end with exception of few initiatives following crisis. The laxity of scholars towards the promotion of shared past and common destine among the peoples of the region has produced intricate crisis. Thus, the region became a center of humanitarian crisis and cradle of poverty. In 2009 alone an estimated 19.8 million people were in need of emergency assistance (FEWSNET, 2009). For almost forty years the region has been wracked by wars. About two million people died in due to war and famine only between 1982 and 1992.All across the Horn, warfare has been accompanied by famine. Many researchers marked the colonial boundaries as one of the causes for these conflicts because boundaries once established tend to persist through their impact upon the human imagination (Matthies, 2005; Fisher 1949: cited in Vadala, 2003:2).

### 3. THE TRANS PLANTATION OF MODERN STATE SYSTEM IN HORN OF AFRICA

Although scholars differ about the date and condition that led to the origin of the modern system of sovereign and territorial polities, most agree that the process was concurrent with the age of exploration and the era of merchant capitalism (1500–1800), an era that was characterize by intensified territorialization and a revolution in transportation (Heimann, 1945:24).This event has dramatically changed European's global image in which the world was viewed as an integrated landmass of discrete places surrounded by Minor Ocean to one in which bound able space was dominated by a world of ocean.

In short, the medieval conception of the universe as universal cosmos was shattered and empires gave way to multiple national states (Ibid). Then on wards, image of social space derived from territory-sovereignty nexus produced and continually re-inscribed within the modern state system. This phenomenon was transplanted into the HoA during the colonial upsurge.

Thus, contemporary states of HoA are results of a great reversal observed in a historic momentum of colonialism which gave absolute sovereign prerogative for a territory bounded by space. This reversals brought about obsession with territorial identity and wars of geography by aborting the internal organic developments (Moussa, 38-45: Kaplan, 2009; Bereket-ab, 2009: Ottaway, 1982:15).

Therefore, the constituting states of the Horn are modeled after the colonial powers experiment in the post Westphalia period without taking in to account the pre-colonial historic realities. Thus, they are byproducts of the imperial rivalries than a genuine pattern of population settlement along geographical or ethnic lines (Woodward, 1996: 13 cited in Vadala, 2003:2).

As it's vividly articulated by Clapham (2000), the process that shaped state formation in Europe was completely different from what had been pivotal in Africa. According to him, in Europe it was the internal war, the bureaucratization and the formation of imagined community that shaped the emergence of nation states where as in Africa it was the external conquest of the imperialist power that led its foundation (Clapham, 2000:3). This is why the experiment of building nation state became dysfunctional (Crummey, 2003:117).

Marina Ottawa, like Clapham, attributes colonial imposition as an agent of the emergency the post-colonial identities of the states of HOA. She has also discredited the Eritrean nationalists' claim of the existence of historic Eritrean as an independent political unity before 1890 and Ethiopianists' assertion of 3000 years history of state hood (Teshale 1996 :414).However, in reference to the latter Ottowan grounded on the nature of the Ethiopian empire state which was expanding in time of glory and turning in to blink of disintegration in times of agony embracing variegated population composition either due to boundary modification or immigration.

Here the researcher would like to raise Clapham's question which is hardly addressed by Ottoway: Does the state cease to exist or radically change its characteristics or remain the same albeit change in its boundary (Clapham, 2001:3)? In accordance to the Westphalia state model, change of boundary entails change of state. This argument leads us to scrutinize the raison d'être why Europeans invented a pre-colonial state status to the post-colonial horn. Critical investigation shows that such fabric was planned to strengthen elites bargaining position vis-à-vis the functioning state and to ascertain their continued interference through them after the decolonization of the region.

Moreover, the elites had been entrusted the task of producing imaginary community modeled after the nation states of Europe (Anderson, 1991). This has ignited elusive passion and fervor ultra-nationalism under the banner of 'mythical nation'. Thus, territorial nationalism has burst out of the artificially installed state identity. This marked a great departure from the pre-colonial modes of social organizations of the African society (Ottaway, 1982:20) whereby non-territorial markers of identity such as family, kinship, religion, tribe and clan ties have been playing central role in determining identity. Most vivid instance for such a case is a wandering tribe whose authority structure is completely dissociated from a fixed loyalty to a particular piece of land as we witness it among the wondering pastoralist and in the 'no man's land' of refugees(Omar in, Ali J. Ahmed, 1995:117-22).

Unlike this pre-colonial back ground, in the colonial cartography, ethnic communities were either arbitrarily split or lumped together with other dissimilar groups in new states with little regard to their wishes, often resulting in states with little sense of national identity or unity. Therefore, nationalism is alien superimposition and recent phenomena in HoA. For instance, the emergence of Sudanese nationalism was facilitated by Arab invasions, the spread of Islam and the Turco-Egyptian occupation of 1821, the Egyptian nationalism and the British colonial rule (P. M. Holt, 1966: 27-59). Eritrea, Somali, Djibouti and Southern Sudan are all very recent inventions shaped by the legacies of colonial cartography (Ottaway, 16).Hence, the rigid territory centric political entities and pervasive tensions which are the basic hallmarks of the constituting states of the H0A are transplanted and radicalized by European colonial upsurge (Ottaway, 15).

Moreover, state building in the postcolonial horn of Africa suffers from problem of institutionalization which emanates from the unbalanced duality of the pre-colonial indigenous institutions with the western models (Redie 2011). The latter were transplanted together with the colonial state or imported by the post-colonial state. However, traditional institutions were handover from pre-colonial societal structures surviving the tide of the colonial institutional slaughter (Ibid). Bereketab describes that the absence of functional harmony between the two competing institutions as the main source of the problem in state-building in the HoA. He noted about the necessity of finding means of coexistence between the pre-colonial indigenous institutions and the colonially transplanted foreign institutions. For such end he proposed the fusion of these two institutional systems so as to have a harmonious and functional state in the HoA (Ibid).

However some other scholars such as Davidson argued for disentangling the two components. Still others argue against all the legacy of colonialism as irrelevant and dangerous for the post-colonial state and call for liberation of the African states from the imposition of European. Still some Scholars attribute the failure to the failure of having modernization or westernization (Redie 2011). Nurdin Farah, Somali novelist calls for negating European inventions in framing world order, cultural map and social engineering that appraises maps, the invented truth of one's imagination and the logic of force. He further claims that the maps the Europeans drew in the Horn are not only invented but were also deliberate distortion of the History of Africa. Thus, colonialism which was asserting as if it were a forerunner of African globalism ended with producing partitioned sovereign jurisdictions of HoA.

The destructive legacies of colonialism together with elite driven politicization of history and identity block the endeavor for re-uniting the societies for sustainable development and economic cooperation. Political elites resorted to centralizing strategies and suppressing pluralism for consolidates national unity. But in the post 1990s, unitary states disrupted. The limited penetration of the rural society by the state generated an urban-rural dictum. Thus, the marginal peoples either view the state as an alien entity or as dead institution (Redie,1).Generally, the post-colonial political cataclysm (Andebrhan, 2010:40) in the horn was decisively guided by the foundations led down during the colonial period and further consolidated by political elites. Therefore, the artificiality of the state and the deliberate breakups of earlier interconnections have produced enclaves which stimulates sub-nationalism which is often expressed using the epithet "greater" as it's manifested in the movements for Greater Somali (Bahru, 2008:366),'Greater Afar (Shehim and James,1980:209),Greater Eritrea or Greater Tigray' (Alemseged, 1998:2-4).

#### 4. THE EROSION OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE COLONIAL STATE SYSTEMIN THE HORN

There exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon (McNair, 1928).

### THE PRECEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

The concept has been contested throughout history. Especially during age of enlighten it has changed its definition, concept, and application. Though sovereignty encompasses many diverse forms, a western interpretation has come *81 Elite Res J. Edu Rev.* ls.), 2001:242). Sovereignty is absolutely unlimited right, not restricted by a constitution, by the laws of its predecessors or by custom to control everything and every kind of activity in its territory. Sovereignty is a two-edged sword with one edge protecting the state against external threats and the other directed against the domestic population (Welde, 2010:2). Norms of sovereignty are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations under article 2(4) which prohibits attacks on "political independence and territorial integrity and in Article 2(7) in restricting intervention. Sovereignty may be recognized even when the sovereign body possesses no territory or its territory is under partial or total occupation by another power. In international law, sovereignty means that a form government possesses full control over its own affairs within a territorial or geographical area or limit.

Following the dissolution of feudal hierarchies in late medieval Europe, political space came to be organized in terms of exclusive state control over self-enclosed territorial domains. This development was institutionalized in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648(The Peace of Munster,1648)which recognized the existence of a system composed of contiguous, bounded territories ruled by sovereign states committed to the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs(Brenner, 1999).Theorists have divergent stance over the necessity or desirability of absoluteness. A fundamental polarity is between theories that assert that sovereignty is vested directly in the sovereign by divine or natural right and theories that assert it is vested in the people. In the latter case there is a further division into those that assert that the people transfer their sovereignty to the sovereign (Hobbes), and those that assert that the people retain their sovereignty (Rousseau). Representative democracies permit (against Rousseau's thought) a transfer of the exercise of sovereignty from the people to the parliament or the government. Parliamentary sovereignty refers to a representative democracy where the Parliament is, ultimately, the source of sovereignty, and not the executive power. The republic form of government acknowledges that the sovereign power is founded in the people, individually, not in the collective or whole body of free citizens, as in a democratic form.

The key element of sovereignty in the legalistic sense is the exclusivity of jurisdiction. It is generally held that sovereignty requires not only the legal right to exercise power, but the actual exercise of such power. That is, "No de jure sovereignty without de facto sovereignty." Basically, the history of sovereignty elapsed two phase. The first belongs to the development of a system of sovereign states following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.Machiavelli, Luther, Bodin, and Hobbes were major thinkers of the first phase. The second movement is the circumscription of the sovereign state which began after World War II calling for interventionist laws and practices to protect human rights. The most prominent thinkers were the critic Bertrand de Juvenile and Jacques Maritain(Kantorowicz, E., 1957:67).

Legitimacy, supremacy and territoriality are also core elements of sovereignty. Territoriality specifies that membership of peoples derives from their residence within borders. It is a powerful principle, for it defines membership in a way that may not correspond with identity. In course of time sovereignty creates dysfunctions viz. anarchic order in the international system and the internal dimension of sovereignty, the absolute power of the state over the body politic, results in centralism, not pluralism. Finally, the supreme power of the sovereign state is contrary to the democratic notion of accountability.

#### 5. THE PRECEPT OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Territorial integrity is the principle under international law that fosters inviolability of frontiers and the intactness of borders by delegitimizing separatist movements and acts of force full border change. In recent years there is tension between this principle and the concept of humanitarian intervention to develop self-government and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement (http//www.un.org/en/document/charter/chapter 1.htm). In the Post-WWII strict application of territorial integrity has given rise to a number of problems and, when faced with reality "on the ground", can be seen as too artificial a construct (Elden, 2005).

In 2005 World Summit, the world's nations agreed on the right of humanitarian intervention. It has been argued that this could create a flexible application of concept of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The UN resolution adopted by

the United Nations Security Council reaffirmed the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity(UN Security Council Resolution 1674,2006).

However, this responsibility to protect refers only to the ability of external powers to override sovereignty and does not explicitly involve the changing of borders. In short, what Jackson termed as `quasi-statehood' the pretense that formally independent states should be treated `as if ' they possessed the full attributes of sovereignty, even if they evidently did not in fact do so was used to cover up cracks in the facade, under the assumption that these cracks would eventually be sealed, and that artificial states would solidify into the real thing. Both superpowers and former colonial powers helped to maintain the states for whose protection they assumed responsibility, by means of diplomatic support, economic aid and, if need be, direct military intervention (Jackson, 1990:781).

Moreover, the borders of a sovereign state may not at all circumscribe a "people" but in fact encompass several identities. It is rather by simple virtue of their location within geographic borders that people belong to a state and fall under the authority of its ruler. It is within a geographic territory that modern sovereigns are supremely authoritative. Territoriality is now deeply taken for granted. Here is important to discuss the question why the Westphalia State take the territorial form and possess the boundaries that they do?

States have lifecycles similar to those of human beings who created them. Hardly any member State of the United Nations has existed within its present borders for longer than five generations. The attempt to freeze human evolution has in the past been a futile undertaking and has probably brought about more violence than if such a process had been controlled peacefully (Hans-Adam II, 2000).

This quote explains us the about the existence of generations of states that replenish, renewed and supplanted by it's subsequent. Thus, territoriality in this sense is means of entrusting and insuring continuity in change. Still there is very challenging question from Clapham, do states define the boundaries or do boundaries define the states? (Clapham, 2001:3).It is not easy to give simplistic answer for this challenging question but from the historic experience we have in the Horn boundaries were defining agents. The problem lies on how to explain change in boundary and state continuity and thereof grading ages of states. Physical geographers argue in favor of boundaries from the functionalist point of view. Accordingly, movement, beyond and across, as well as within a bounded territory, serves to reproduce the territory that is being bounded. It follows that to understand the history of a territorial entity one must go beyond tracing the spatially fixed activities that occur within that territory or the discursive strategies through which the territory is made to appear natural. One must also trace the acts of movement that occur within, across, and outside the territory's boundaries and the designation of specific spaces of movement as beyond territorial control. In short according to them, one cannot understand the construction of "inside" space as a series of territories of fixity, society, modernization, and development without simultaneously understanding the construction of "outside" space as an arena of mobility that is deemed unsuitable for territorial control (Steinberg, 2009: 469). However this can be proved vain for no one can observe such boundaries even from space craft. The visual representations which made us familiar with territorial shapes of states the emblems for national identities are mere artificial constructs without basing reality.

### 6. THE STATE SYSTEM IN CRISIS

States which are established to keep peace and order and ensure the welfare of their citizens turned themselves towards war mongers entities, sources of humiliation and humanitarian disasters. For instance, African spectators and scholars noted that the postcolonial prototype states in Africa are undergoing deep crisis (Andebrhan, 2010:2). In the HOA, apparently a host of factors stand for the crisis of the state and the concomitant festering of conflicts. Among the factors that can be accounted for the state crisis and conflicts are international interventions driven by strategic, economic, and political and security interests (Ibid).Recently also concern of global war on terror and anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia that brought virtually the entire world naval forces to the region have compounded the issue. However, the project of state building which is the epicenter of the crisis of the state in the HOA is fundamentally a domestic process but external interventions adversely affect the state building process, which make the state precarious and susceptible to intra-state and inter-state conflicts.

Due these twin challenges, most of the states of the Horn are becoming fragile. If this is the fact, is there a need to rescue them or let them die? I argue letting them die is the solution. Moreover, human beings are not necessarily protected by the state for it's an obstacle to humanitarian intervention during repression (Osiander, 2001: 251-287). In support of this assertion clapham noted as;
   …the attempt to institute modern states has so far succeeded only in intensifying conflict and oppression.
   They have lamentably failed to establish either a genuine sovereignty for the peoples of the horn or the

conditions for creative negotiation of modernity on their behalf. Borders are part of the problem and have led to destructive [inter-state and intra state] wars between Somalia and Ethiopia… Ethiopia and Eritrea… [these] wars … have cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars that might have been directed to health social welfare and education (Crummy,130).

As it's clearly explained by Clapham the process of instituting states has become very problematic and thus an alternative means need to be designed. Moreover, when we assess the role of States of the Horn in curbing conflict and promoting peace, we find it being by far the most unstable region in Sub-Saharan Africa today. This is substantiated by scholarly works which testify to the fact that the region was subjected for chronic and multifaceted intra-state and inter-state conflicts. As result millions of people have died and many more displaced or forced into exile. The Horn of Africa region has been marred by civil wars, internal political turmoil, inter-state wars, famine, and man-made humanitarian disasters. The region has also emerged as a safe haven for international terrorist groups (Ted, 2010:1).

In short, the Horn is distinguished by recurrent state crisis, international interventions and the most conflict prone, unstable and underdeveloped region in the African continent (Redie, 2010:5) Surprisingly the state is the par excellence sources of the predicament. The precarious nature of the state building in the HOA has given rise to chronic state crisis. State crisis in turn leads to festering conflicts because state crisis and conflicts feed into each other (Redie, 1).The incapability of states to dialogue with each other and with their internal dissident results in armed violence and the involvement of civilians in civil wars (Wasara, 2002:40). Political exclusion, economic marginalization, and social discrimination threaten the security of citizens to the extent that they regard the state as the primary threat to their survival (Ibid).

## 7. CONCLUSION

The idea that the inhabited area of the globe must be divided among sovereign territorial states is a recent development which is largely the product of European colonialism and eventually turned into a global norm. This practice is challenged both by the inherent difficulties of state maintenance, and by globalization. States are becoming expensive organizations to maintain, not only in economic terms but also in the demands that they make on their citizens and their own employees. The conviction of unfettered state sovereignty must be dissociated safely to be consigned to the past. The process of forging a common regional identity and political ideology in the Horn demands a systematic act of unveiling and of selecting long travelled shared traits from a wide range of cultural features and historical circumstances without having colonial intellectual dependence.

Breaking up the  fenced thinking and the territoriality of the individual mind socialized by the Oedipal and Oedipalized territorialities; family, church, school, nation demands the de-territorialized flow of desires that have not been reduced to the Oedipal codes and the neuroticized territorialities. The desiring machines that escape such codes lead elsewhere de-territorialization in case these works might, for example, introduce a 'disturbance' to an existing order and territory. Thus, the obsession with territorial identity should give way for interactive social gnosis. However, the creation and recreation experiments held so far of this common identity were tainted with historicizing in lieu of revealing the actual historical facts. It's this historical crime that made all the experiments of forging unity of the peoples of the horn a tentative gesture in lieu of being a comprehensive guide of lasting process of interaction in all walks of life. The articulation of a common identity among the peoples of the horn, in a relatively narrow geographical setting, can be designed by retrospective historical investigation on Ethiopia and its neighbors, Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia predominantly before the onset of the colonial upsurge. This can be backed by process of broadening of social knowledge and re-evaluation of the concept of state hood with sacrosanct boundaries which is allergic to the region.

Developing the capability to sanction intellectual dependency should be the fore front agenda in the redefining process of state hood and sovereignty. Moreover, introducing and promoting regional consociationalism or corporate governance which prevents any group from becoming a permanent minority along with enhanced proportional representation across communal divides is very demanding task that has to be shouldered by historians in the Horn. In this regard, individual states of the Horn must open their door to form political and economic integration along democratic lines. Creation of a free trade area and double passport system should be regarded as the first of stage for higher level integration.

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**Statement:**

I hereby confirm that this research paper is my own original work and I have cited all sources that were used.