

INTERNATIONAL RESEARCHERS

**ROLE OF EUROPEAN MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE ARMY
OF RANJIT SINGH: A CASE STUDY OF ITS TRAINING AND
EXPEDITIONS**

Ahmad Ali, Muhammad Akbar, Khizar Hayat

Volume No.6 Issue No.4 December 2017

www.iresearcher.org

ISSN 2227-7471

THE INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH JOURNAL "INTERNATIONAL RESEACHERS"

www.iresearcher.org

© 2017 (individual papers), the author(s)

© 2017 (selection and editorial matter)

This publication is subject to that author (s) is (are) responsible for Plagiarism, the accuracy of citations, quotations, diagrams, tables and maps. Corresponding author is responsible for the consent of other authors.

All rights reserved. Apart from fair dealing for the purposes of study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the applicable copyright legislation, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process without written permission from the publisher. For permissions and other inquiries, please contact

editor@iresearcher.org

INTERNATIONAL RESEARCHERS is peer-reviewed, supported by rigorous processes of criterion-referenced article ranking and qualitative commentary, ensuring that only intellectual work of the greatest substance and highest significance is published.

INTERNATIONAL RESEARCHERS is indexed in wellknown indexing diectories



with ICV value 5.90



Directory of Research Journals Indexing

and monitor by



ROLE OF EUROPEAN MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE ARMY OF RANJIT SINGH: A CASE STUDY OF ITS TRAINING AND EXPEDITIONS

¹Ahmad Ali, ²Muhammad Akbar, ³Khizar Hayat

¹Lecturer in History at Govt. Degree College Mailsi, ²Senior Subject Specialist, Education Department, GoP,

³Primary School Teacher, Education Department, GoP.

(PAKISTAN)

prof.aamughal786@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

In the eighteenth century, Northern India had turned into the phase of the conflict of two extraordinary and notable powers, the Mughal kingdom and the Khalsa. In 1707, when Aurangzeb inhaled his last, the Mughal Empire had stretched out from Kabul to Dhaka and from Deccan to Kashmir. After his demise, his sons, to hold the Delhi throne, adopted the pattern of wars to defeat one another. The nobles also favoured this, and separated their own pound of tissue from defeators and the defeated. These wars partitioned the graciousness and annihilated the consistency of focal power. The nobles, who were the focal bureaucracy, disregarded the real repetitive task of the State. The principal treasury got no normal income. There was no cash to pay the troops or frivolous authorities. What was going on in Delhi was being revised in the smaller States too. The Kingdom, due to inward issues of party politics and the shortcomings of the Mughal Emperor, had turned into a community with Nadir Shah's invasion in 1739. Then Abdali, who followed Nadir Shah, came here and designated his own governors in Lahore, Multan and Sarhind, etc. By the mid-eighteenth century, as the Afghans displaced the Mughals in the seats of power, the adversaries changed and the Khalsa battle proceeded. As a result, Ranjit Singh, an adventurous Sikh chief, set up a Kingdom and raised a solid armed forces for its security. This research article highlights the planning, interests and expansionism of Ranjit Singh which resulted in the annexation of Multan.

Keywords: Ranjit Singh, Khalsa Army, General Ventura, General Allard, Nawab Muzaffar Khan, Ala Suit, En pied

1. INTRODUCTION

The ascent of the Sikhs, as another power in Northern India, was not sudden, rather it was a continuous procedure extending admirably over the whole eighteenth century. Disobedience had not only shaken the Mughal Government but also ascended the full anger of imperial reprisal. *Bhangi* Sikhs, being utilized at the time in raiding and looking for assets, or in demanding tribute in Multan and Bahawalpur regions, failed to manage the cost of aid. (Prinsep, 1834) Numerous liberty *Sardars*, who had previously attached themselves to the *Bhangi Misl*, exchanged their services. Meanwhile, Abdali's son, Timur Shah, pushed them from Multan and protected his colonies of Bahawalpur, Mankera and Sind from their violation. (Jafri) During this period, the British were in a position to intrude the undertakings of the Sikh *Sardars* of the *Malwa* and influence of Ranjit Singh. (Prinsep, 1834) The whole goods, tributes, incomes, *Rakhis* and fines went into the state treasury and they were not disseminated among his officers. Along these lines, Ranjit Singh set up his own inconsequential Kingdom and sowed the seeds of the Sikh government and acquired his patrimony. (Prinsep, 1834) During the early days of his rule, Ranjit Singh needed to battle and stifle various chiefs to unite his kingdom. He crushed the Afghans and pushed them outside the Khyber, which is presently the Western border of Pakistan. The accomplishments of his army might be credited to its inspiration and a rich legacy. (Chughtai, 2000) Ranjit Singh was totally valiant and a conceived trooper. Whenever, he found his officers and soldiers in a trouble in the battlefield or considered them unable to triumph over the adversary, he at once appeared on the scene and proceeded with his tempered sword and pushed the foe away from the combat zone. He was dauntless and extremely attached to hear the stories of valour. (Griffin, Rulers of India: Ranjit Singh, 1893)

2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Ranjit Singh, due to courage, valour and headship qualities, demonstrated keen concentration in employing the Hindus in his military. Undoubtedly, mostly subjugations, when he was struggling to launch his kingdom, were happening with them. He was assisted in his regional enlargement by them and raised him from the chief-ship to the Monarch of the Punjab. The European strategies, which had brought triumphs to the East India Company against the monarchs like *Maharaja* Sindhia, Tipu Sultan and Juswant Rao Holkar, could not retreat Ranjit's consideration. The most of the Sikh army consisted of *Katiyawand* who originated their own horses and got a binary share of the prize. (Griffin, Rulers of India: Ranjit Singh, 1893) The *Maharaja* observed the benefits in the rising of artillery and infantry units. He, in perspective of increasing infantry divisions, was eager for employing ex-sepoys of the Company. In

1809, when the British called a pause to Lahore *Sarkar's* triumph about the *Cis-Sutlej* states, it induced him to train his military to check the proceeding of the British.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

On the eve of Ranjit Singh's intrusion, there were some autonomous empires, which had sorted out themselves under their tribal pioneers. These pioneers were the Pathans of Kasur, Chatthas of Rasulnagar, Sials of Jhang, Tiwanas of Shahpur and Baloch of Khushab and Awans of Sahiwal. Ultimately, these States, governed by the Pathans, were running on behalf of the king of Kabul. These were Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Mankera and Peshawar, Bahawalpur, Bannu, Tonk and Hazara. (Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908) To unite and shape a unified political union of all the above narrow-minded chiefs, it was necessary to inspire them to form a cautious military organization against external attacks. (Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908) A brief sketch of Ranjit's victories, to defeat the Muslim tribes in the North and the central districts and acquisition of Multan, Kashmir, Peshawar and Derajat, has given below. (Griffin, Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Barrier between our Growing Empire and Central Asia, 1916)

Multan was ruled by an Afghan family, who was appointed as Nawabs in 1738, at the time of Nadir Shah's invasion. The Mughal Government, which was very anxious to strengthen its distant provinces by a system of decentralization, was too weak to control it. (Griffin, Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Barrier between our Growing Empire and Central Asia, 1916) For the first time in 1802, Muzaffar Khan saw Ranjit Singh, who had marched from Lahore to Multan. After covering the distance of thirty miles, Nawab came out to meet him and the chiefs, having interchanged valuable presents, parted as very good friends. (Griffin, Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Barrier between our Growing Empire and Central Asia, 1916) At that time, the area of Multan had prolonged its limits to the Chenab, Ravi and the Sutlej. Besides this, Muzaffargarh, Moradabad, Khangarh, Rangpur and Ghazanfargarh had also been merged in Multan. While Lodhran, Kahrur, Mailsi, Dunyapur and Kabula, though located on this side of the Sutlej and the Ravi, were excluded in Multan. (Gilani, 1938) The length of Multan region was 110 miles and the broadness was 70 miles. (Durrani, 1981) A little area, close to the river, was rich, yet the remaining region was infertile and meagerly populated. During the Sikh political agitation, numerous towns were demolished. Total income of Multan was 500000 rupees, of which 250000 was settled at the tribute and paid routinely to the Afghan King. (Durrani, 1981) Nawab's army was comprised of 2000 men and 20 firearms, however the number could be increased in crisis by gathering 10000 to 12000 civilian army. Muzaffar Khan made adequate plans for the barrier of the Fort and the city. He developed a store for ammunition in the Fortress. He provided extraordinary consideration to the enlistment and the preparation of his officers. He was very kind to cavalry therefor, a noteworthy portion of his customary armed forces was comprised of cavalry. (Durrani, 1981)

The Sikhs were hopeless because they could not assault Multan for over 6 years. (Ali, The History of Bahawalpur, 1848) The reason was that Nawab Muzaffar Khan had set up sincere relations with all the conspicuous Muslims of India. He gave them donations and paid regard to everyone who came to his Kingdom since, he was aware of the whole political circumstances in Northern India. (Durrani, 1981) He had attempted to merge the Muslims of Multan, however, observing their shortcomings, he decided a constant battle to defend his State from the hostility of the Sikhs. He, with such an extraordinary certainty, began to govern in Multan that Timur Shah could not attack India after 1789. (Durrani, 1981) When Timur Shah expanded the amount of revenue in Multan then he needed to gather the revenues with the cruelty which was disdained by his kin. (Durrani, 1981) Though, his government had to face non-stop battles, nonetheless, he focused his consideration for the betterment and improvement of his subjects. He founded *Musan Hatti* on that road which leads from Multan to Dera Ghazi Khan. (Govt. of the Punjab, 1910) He wished to construct a fortress, so, in 1794, the city and fort of Muzaffargarh was founded. (Govt. of the Punjab, 1910)

The year 1801 saw many crucial incidents because Shah Zaman was ousted after 9 years disturbed rule in Afghanistan. His elder brother, Mahmud, was professed the King with the assist of the Barakzais. In India, Ranjit Singh succeeded in seizing a massive territory of the West Punjab. Nizam-ud-Din, the *Nazim* of Kasur, also proclaimed his supremacy. The family disputes of the Saddozais endorsed Ranjit Singh to fulfil his terrible plans towards the Muslims of the Punjab and Multan. (Govt. of the Punjab, 1910)

Due to this converting scenario, Nawab Muzaffar Khan also organized himself to obtain political advantages. Throughout the reign of Shah Mahmud, Afghanistan was certainly dominated through his Wazir Fateh Khan Barakzai. Nawab Muzaffar Khan also halted the yearly tribute to the Kabul. All above events inspired Ranjit Singh to attack on Multan. He was an imperialist and expansionist while the weaknesses and alarming situation of Afghans, the Saddozai chiefs and the Subedar of Multan provided him a golden opportunity to quench of his policy of expansionism.

Ranjit Singh, a formidable Sikh chief, appeared in the scenario of the Punjab to make his State circumvallated by a sturdy border. He, initially, faced serious dangers to establish his splendid authority over some huge or small States located in the Southern parts of the Punjab. Multan, due to its socio-cultural resemblance and geographical cohesion, might be conquered by the aid of overseas strength so that a Sikh Kingdom could be established in the Punjab. (Sinha, 1933) To Ranjit Singh, all was fair in expanding the maximum limitations of his State so, he used all fair and foul strategies to acquire his intention of expansion. (Sinha, 1933)

Through the treaty of Amritsar (1809), the Eastward expansion was barred and the Sikh rule would now boast only at the expense of the Kabul Empire that still held Kashmir, Attock, Peshawar, Dera Ghazi Khan, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu. Ranjit Singh, having a so called sovereignty over Multan, lost all the hopes to set up his authority in the South-East of the Punjab. (Sinha, 1933) Multan, due to its massive annual revenue, was a large enchantment for him. He was terribly in need of finance to build a huge army so that he might consolidate and maintain complete control over the territories of the Western and Northern parts of the country. Usually, by political need and economic benefits, the occupation of Multan was his first priority. (Garrett, 1970) Without owning its hold, the Sikh State might be on the verge of a volcano. His transactions with Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk and other rulers of Peshawar, Bahawalpur, Multan and Kashmir, whose territories had been attached to his own, were the brilliant occasions of his career. (Garrett, 1970)

We know that Multan province, earlier than the Afghans or the Sikhs regime, was a part of the Mughal Empire. It, along with Sind, was generated by Ahmad Shah Abdali in 1757. In 1767, the Bhangi Misl made their first attempt to capture it, yet, in 1772, they were invited to intervene in a dispute for the governorship of Multan between Shuja Khan Sadozais and Haji Sharif Beg. They defeated the combined forces of Shuja Khan and the Nawab of Bahawalpur. The Bhangis, instead of giving the region to the host, detained the fort and proclaimed Multan as a Khalsa territory. (Hasrat, 1977) Their rule continued for seven years. In 1779, Timur Shah walked to Multan with a huge armed force and, after the siege of 40 days, constrained the Sikh battalion to empty it. (Griffin, *The Punjab Chiefs: Historical and Biographical Notices of the Principal Families*, 1890) He nominated Muzaffar Khan as Governor of Multan, who, from that point until his demise in 1818, involved in consistent conflict of arms with the Sikhs. (Griffin, *Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Barrier between our Growing Empire and Central Asia*, 1916) In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Abdali's empire was demolished due to the civil war. Thus, the territory of Multan became the objective of Ranjit Singh's expansionism. (Gilani, 1938) After the occupation of Lahore, Ranjit Singh had not only provoked the chiefs of other Misls but also the Nawab of Kasur to launch his expeditions of extension. Infrequently, he traced the course of an objective and thus, his expeditions expanded over a number of years. He went back and again going back and thus, recurring to his objective without observing to any constant time, he succeeded to capture Multan, Kashmir, Mankera and Peshawar.

The Province of Multan was 175 kms long and 120 kms wide. Four important rivers, the Indus, Ravi, Chenab and the Sutlej, ran through it. It was an antique and wealthy city which located on the East bank of the River Chenab in the mid of massive waste land. It was the most essential trading hub for caravans which entered from central Asia through the Bolan Pass. Many Victors adopted the Multan route to reach the heart of Hindustan. (Singh K. , 1977) It was located on the edge of the rivers and was enclosed through a wall about five km in perimeter. The external side of this wall was sixteen meters high. The wall had plentiful towers and six gates. In 1808, Elphinstone Mountstuart, who toured the city, writes that:

It was 6.5 km from the river banks and was bounded by using a wall between 40 to 50 feet high. The country was productive, plane and had appropriate soil. Although, it had canals for irrigations, yet it was a nicely cultured country going to decline. (Hasrat, 1977)

He also discovered that the government was demanding heavy taxes and insatiable anarchic troops indulging in every kind of exploitation. At that time, the military of the Nawab consisted of probable 2000 sturdy men with 20 guns, however 10000 militia could be called out at the time of disaster. (Hasrat, 1977)

When Ranjit Singh's military power was on expansion, he comprehended the capability of his armed forces so well that he liked to exercise the economy of exertion. He did not escape in the bombastic endeavours for wonderfulness like Napoleon in Russia. He, having a Guerilla approach, never delayed cancelling a military undertaking for one more day. (Sinha, 1933) He adopted the same tactic with Multan. He did not utilize the entire armed forces in a single effort because his policy was not to kill his effective enemy in a single stroke. However, he stroke at him until he grew as vulnerable as to submit voluntarily or to be defeated without loss of men, cash and material. (Kiernan, 1970) In 1802, he started an investigative campaign till Multan by passing Jhang, then in 1805, he compressed Jhang and endangered Multan. (Hasrat, 1977) This was recurrent in 1807, 1810, 1816 and 1817. Lastly, in 1818, he took the control of Multan Fort and employed his own Governor to control it. It was noteworthy that the campaigns of 1802 and 1807 were mere initial evaluation. Their purpose was not to capture Multan. An extended campaign indicates the arrangement as well as the homework of the armed force which creates a specific courage.

Jhang was situated on the East side of the River Chenab. It was 150 km North-East of Multan. By its distinctive feature and geographical location, it ruled the Doab among the Chenab and the Ravi. (Singh A. , 1992) Similarly, the Sial leader of Jhang gave him the capacity to accumulate a large number of unbalanced tribal to form a military which was dispatched to capture Jhang and Multan. In 1803, he dispatched his diplomats to Ahmad Khan, the chief of Jhang, and demanded praise as well as a promise of regular payment. (Singh A. , 1992) When the negotiations ended with unclear promises, which Ranjit Singh was expecting, he issued the orders for the diminishing Jhang to his infantry battalions in unification with weaponry and Ghorcharas. The war continued till evening and the fatalities on each side had been very tremendous. (Griffin, *The Punjab Chiefs: Historical and Biographical Notices of the Principal Families*, 1890) Ranjit Singh overwhelmed the city at night and lock down the transportation and

infrastructures. The blockade continued for three days. When the Sial Chief realized himself isolated then he escaped to Multan with his family. His massive treasure was sent to Lahore while the rest was robbed by the soldiers. After that, Ranjit Singh advanced to attack the cities of Ouch, Sahiwal and Garh Maharaja. (Singh A. , 1992) Their Muslim Chiefs were forced to pay currency and horses. Ahmad Khan Sial also advanced to present a tribute of 60000 rupees annually. His agreement was admitted and Ranjit Singh allowed him to go back to Jhang. (Singh A. , 1992)

In 1806, when Ranjit Singh was again on the way to Multan, Muzaffar Khan visited him at Mahtam which was situated 20 miles away in the North of Multan. Muzaffar Khan presented him costly gifts along with 70000 rupees. Ranjit Singh accepted the presents and returned to Lahore. (Griffin, Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Barrier between our Growing Empire and Central Asia, 1916) On his way back, he came to know about Holkar, who was crossing Sutlej to pursue Ranjit Singh. Leaving his commander Fateh Singh, to acquire the tribute, and bring up the weapons and heavy luggage, he rushed to Amritsar. (Bhatia, 1992) This was the first occasion when he met face to face with the English and the Marathas. Qutb-ud-din Khan, a Pathan chief in Kasur, was the best friend of the Nawab of Multan. In 1807, Ranjit weakened Kasur and forced its Nawab to confine to Mamdot. The same year, he captured Dipalpur and gave it as a Jagir to his son, Kharak Singh, and then advanced to Multan with a massive armed forces. To save his territory, Muzaffar Khan was compelled to pay a tremendous payment. After this, Ranjit Singh went to Bahawalpur. The Nawab sent his Vakil to him and, after a friendly settlement, the Khalsa Armed forces vacated it. (Ali, The History of Bahawalpur, 1848)

A dispute, amongst the British and Ranjit Singh over Cis-Sutlej states, was turning into battle clouds which was resolved in 1809 by the Treaty of Amritsar. (Durrani, 1981) After this treaty, he triumphed Kangra in 1810, and then met with Shah Shuja ul-Mulk, the ex-king of Kabul, near Khushab on February 3, 1810. (Singh A. , 1992) They negotiated to get Kashmir and Multan with the collaboration of the Sikh army. (Latif, 1891) However, Shah Shuja was doubtful about the Sikh strategies and could not reach any accord with Ranjit Singh. (Hasrat, 1977) Ranjit Singh made a pact of justification with Shah Shuja, who had genetic right over Multan, for giving a challenge to Muzaffar Khan because Ranjit Singh had dual purpose in his mind. (Durrani, 1981) First, it was an effort that if the Nawab of Multan abdicated Multan, he might be capable to keep him away from extended expedition for Multan. Secondly, as next activities will display, he will be able to reap marvelous power by preserving his strategies over Khushab, Sahiwal and then Multan. (Singh A. , 1992)

Ranjit Singh marched to Sahiwal hastily, yet Fateh Khan, the Bloch chief, was not deceived and the Sikh armed forces saw him ready for a fight. Vakils were dispatched to dispel Fateh Khan's dreads and summon him to visit the Sikh court. But he, as a substitute, sent Lal Khan with wealthy gifts. Ranjit Singh accepted the gifts as per tradition and sent obvious gratification. (Singh A. , 1992) But after a few days, Ranjit Singh came back and attacked the fort, which completely amazed Fateh Khan and his subjects. The fort was seized and Fateh Khan, along with his relatives, left for Lahore. (Latif, 1891) This incident ensured Zafar Khan, the chief of Khushab, that Ranjit Singh had not gone back. He retreated himself from Sahiwal and then seized Khushab. (Latif, 1891) He had consequently attained a dual wonder. Actually, the Bloch chief should not have anticipated that he, after taking the presents, will go. The Sikh military also demanded tribute from Ouch and Bokhara. (Latif, 1891)

Ranjit's claim, to give up the province of Multan, had been rejected by Muzaffar Khan and had started precise arrangements for its protection. (Hasrat, 1977) Muzaffar Khan stocked the citadel with water and foods for an extended siege. The Sikh military reached Multan on February 24, 1810, and took ownership of the capital on the next day. (Latif, 1891) His arrival frightened the neighbouring Chiefs a lot. Muhammad Khan, the leader of Leia and Bhakkar, paid 120000 rupees for the safety of his territory whilst Sadiq Muhammad Khan, the Nawab of Bahawalpur, presented 100000 rupees. Nawab's tribute was not accepted, but compelled him to provide 500 sturdy horse regiment for the Sikh army to attack Multan. (Ali, The History of Bahawalpur, 1848) Ranjit Singh had paid full consideration to schedule and the groundwork of logistic facility. Widespread measures, by land and water from Lahore and Amritsar, were made and the entire means of the country were wholeheartedly hired for the military authorities. (Latif, 1891)

Muzaffar Khan capitalized the fortress and the positions for placement of artillery weapons were explored cautiously to perform powerful fire. For the Musket shot, all the buildings of the citadel were levelled. Hurdles were fixed and minor canals were run out to retard the operations of the besiegers. (Bhatia, 1992) Besides this, the positions of attacks were chosen. The excessive rewards were assured for those chiefs who might discriminate in this action. Ranjit Singh had brought Zamzama, the Bhangi Gun, from Lahore to hit the walls of the fortress. (Latif, 1891) The remedy to withdrawal was undertaken, however, the besieged were countermined. A substantial weaponry bombardment was kept on for some days. A little arrangement, which was made to defend the fort, had intensified the fervor of the besieged. (Latif, 1891) The weapons, from the high walls of the fort, could hit the farthest area. (Singh K. , 1977) The opponent fired at the Sikhs and killed *Sardar* Attar Singh Dhari along with twelve other Gunners. Ranjit Singh protested against this strategy to the British government and required their help. (Hasrat, 1977) Hasrat writes that:

To counteract the Sadozai Nawab's move, Ranjit Singh made a ludicrous proposal to the British Agent at Ludhiana for a joint conquest of Multan. The move for cooperation in the Sikh ambitions towards Multan was, however, rejected by Fort William. (Hasrat, 1977)

In February 1811, the *Maharaja* reached *Pind* Dadan Khan as well as the territories between the Indus and the Jhelum, and then captured the strongholds. (Latif, 1891) It was not difficult to guess that these actions of Ranjit Singh had generated apprehension in Kabul because the Sikh court had acquired the facts that Shah Muhammad, as the head of 12000 Afghan soldiers, had traversed the Indus. Ranjit Singh instantly advanced to Rawalpindi and took a position there. (Latif, 1891) He sent *Fakir* Aziz-ud-din to Shah's camp to discover his actual goals. Deceptively, the rapid reaction of Ranjit Singh compelled Shah Muhammad to undertake the reconciliatory approach and *Fakir* Aziz-ud-din was informed that he had come to frighten the Afghan Governors of Attock and Kashmir, who had recently reinforced him. (Singh A. , 1992) Comforted with the respond and an affirmation from *Sardar* Jeewan Singh, who had specified that the Shah and his troops were not threat to Lahore *Durbar*, Ranjit Singh reverted to Lahore. (Bhatia, 1992) Under the supervision of Mohkam Chand, a part of the Sikh military was sent to subdue the areas between Multan and Majha. (Durrani, 1981) *Desa* Singh Majithia, with the resource of Artillery under the supervision of Ghous Khan, was directed to reach the fortress of Kotle and capture it. Meanwhile, Ranjit Singh engaged his Generals to fall the last autonomous chiefs and their forts so that they could be merged in the Punjab slowly and steadily.

In September 1811, Mokham Chand detained the ownership of the Faizalpuria Misl of Jalandhar, Phillaur, Patti and Hetpur. For his obvious services, he was appointed as a Diwan and a wealthy Khillat was granted to him. Moreover, a sword set in diamonds and an elephant with a golden Howdah were also granted him. (Latif, 1891) In 1812, Kharak Singh married with Chand Kaur and Sir David Ochterlony was invited as a visitor. He came here with a galloper gun which Ranjit Singh had anticipated to look. (Sarkar, 1992) The same year, Ranjit Singh wished to dispatch Diwan Mokham Chand to complete the investigation of Kashmir so that an expedition could be dispatched. Fateh Khan, the minister of Shah Mahmud of Kabul, suggested to send this expedition with him to conquer Kashmir. In 1813 at Haidaru, a battle was fought for Attock and then in 1814, Ranjit Singh made the primary strive on Kashmir. (Gupta, 1991)

In February 1816, the struggles for the subjugation of Multan were repeated. To acquire the tribute from Bahawalpur and Multan, an unbalanced assault was made on Multan. Phula Singh Akali, along with Diwan Bhawani Das, was dispatched to Multan, yet they agreed to withdraw on the price of 80000 rupees. (Griffin, Rulers of India: Ranjit Singh, 1893) Due to reversion with worthless tribute, Ranjit Singh eliminated Bhawani Das from the command of the troops and imposed a fine on him. (Hasrat, 1977) In 1817, the army, under Diwan Chand and Ram Dayal, was once more dispatched to Multan which had also retreated with a price of 100000 rupees as tribute. (Griffin, Rulers of India: Ranjit Singh, 1893) After that, extra arrangements were set in. Troops were gathered in power and the transportation system, to provide arms and communicate with scattered army, was rationalized. (Hasrat, 1977)

When all these endeavors, to diminish Multan, were happening then Ranjit Singh seemed anxious with the collective approach about the assistance of Muzaffar Khan by the Afghan ruler. Consequently, he conveyed his troops to bring under oppression the heads of various districts. After a triumph or seize of a fortification, he treated the defeated with mercy and generosity. (Singh A. , 1992) The Sardars, who had been the pioneers of the few confederations which he over-tossed, were cut from fairness of respectable subjugation. Besides this, there was a huge gathering of Muhammadan Khans and nobles whom he carefully joined to his fortunes. The leaders of the Mussalman tribes of Sials, Ghebas, Tiwanas and Kharals were also merged in his group. (Griffin, Rulers of India: Ranjit Singh, 1893) So by end of 1817, The Punjabis had isolated from the chain of those little States around Multan which were loyal to the Afghans. (Singh K. , 1977)

In January 1818, a military of 20000 men, with a variety of guns under Elahi Bakhsh, dispatched from Lahore for a crucial and conclusive warfare to carry Multan expedition to a successful cease. (Griffin, Rulers of India: Ranjit Singh, 1893) The selection of this time was the most appropriate because the Kabul authority was in a state of inadequacy and turmoil. Wazir Fateh Khan, the strongman, was concerned within the siege of Herat. (Gupta, 1991) From Kabul, no assistance could be predicted for Muzaffar Khan. Remarkable consideration was paid to logistics. Raj Kaur, mother of Kharak Singh, set up her camp at Kot Kamalia to supervise the movement of materials. (Gupta, 1991) All of the boats at the Ravi, the Jhelum and the Chenab were demanded to hold substances and stores for the troops. Preparations for postal stations between Lahore and Multan were made for quick verbal exchange of information. On the way, the Sikh military captured the forts of Khangarh and Muzaffargarh. (Gupta, 1991)

Nawab Muzaffar Khan was not unconscious of these vast scale arrangements and speculated that this time he would not have the capacity to purchase Lahore Durbar. Once again, he attempted to energize the Muslim farmers for a blessed war against the unbeliever and he arranged the city and fort for an extensive attack. He wanted to shield himself in three phases: in the farmland, in the city, and in the fortress. The main appointment was in the open place, where he furnished his Ghazis with swords and lances. For martyrdom, they looked for a reason to restrain troops outfitted with cannon. This fight continued just a single day and Muzaffar Khan pulled back the remainder of his forces behind the city walls. (Singh A. , 1992)

The second phase started with Lahore troops that were encompassing the city and assaulting its walls. The guards held them for a couple of weeks. At the point when the city walls disintegrated, the protectors, to battle the third and last phase, withdrew into the fort. The citadel was encompassed by an extensive and profound ditch (canal). In spite of the fact that there was no water in the ditch. It was sufficiently wide to keep cannon at a sheltered distance from the walls and profound to make the job of miners exceptionally dangerous. (Singh A. , 1992) For an entire month, Elahi Bakhsh's batteries beat the enormous walls without creating any impression. March swung to April and the warmth got to be distinctly unendurable. The rainstorm was not far-removed. If the fortress, before the ditch was loaded with water, was not taken then it would never abdicate. (Singh K. , 1977)

The city was overcome by the Sikhs, yet the fortress suspended on for nearly four months. The harassed Afghan battalion counterattacked with impressive boldness and perseverance. The Sikh cannon made ruptures in the dense mud and brick walls of the fort which encompassed it, however the Ghazis soon topped them off. The bombardment demonstrated inadequate. (Hasrat, 1977) In April, for the diminishment of the fortification, the *Zamzama* was stirred from Lahore to Multan in 12 days under *Jamadar* Khushal Singh. (Hasrat, 1977) Till the second of June, the siege went on a whole day, the *Zamzama* fired four times and two vast breaks were made in the walls. (Griffin, The Punjab Chiefs: Historical and Biographical Notices of the Principal Families, 1890) While the guard's energies were focused in hindering the harm of the crowd of *Nihangs*. Under the shelter of dusk, the Sikhs laid an excavation in another section of the walls. The following morning, a colossal portion of the fortification was blown sky high. (Singh K. , 1977)

Several attacks were made by the Sikhs and they, on one event, were rebuffed with the loss of 1800 men. The doors were blown in, yet the army raised behind them on which they battled hand to hand with the Sikhs. The guards of the fortification were finally decreased to a few hundred fighters and a large portion of which belonged to Muzaffar's own family or tribe. (Singh A. , 1992) The rest had been slaughtered because they had been intensely betrayed their lord and a lot of them were not able to oppose the temptation. Finally, on the second June, Sadhu Singh overtook with a few nervous devotees into the fortress, and captured it by shocking the Afghans. (Singh A. , 1992) When the Sikh forces sighted this achievement, they proceeded to the attack and reached at the *Khizri* gate.

The old Nawab, with his eight children and the rest army, stood with sword in hand and decided to battle until the demise. Thus, a large number of the Sikhs fell beneath the sharp Afghan swords so, they stepped back and started shooting with match lock at the little party. The Afghan uttered a slogan "go ahead like men". However, this was an invitation which did not accept by the Sikhs. (Singh A. , 1992) The old Muzaffar Khan, along with his five sons, was martyred by the Sikhs while one son, Zulfiqar Khan, was seriously injured. Other two sons, Sarfraz Khan and Amir Beg Khan, were remained safe. *Diwan* Ram Dayal took Sarfraz Khan up on his elephant and gave him a great respect to take his own particular tent. A few of the battalions got away with their lives, and the entire city was given up to loot. Besides this, the jurisdiction of Shujabad was decreased too and five guns were taken from it. After this, the walls of Multan were mended, and an army of six hundred men, being left in the fortress under the charge of *Sardars* Jodh Singh and Dal Singh, the Sikh armed forces came back to Lahore. (Griffin, The Punjab Chiefs: Historical and Biographical Notices of the Principal Families, 1890)

To support the altered tactics, it was essential to advance the artillery and infantry so that a harmonized fire from muskets and guns could break and halt a cavalry. However, the Sikh army had placed very slight confidence on artillery and nil on infantry. The foot warrior had only to protect the fortress. The Sikhs were so scorned for this arm that Ranjit Singh had to register *Purbias* and traitors from the East India Company to form a new infantry which could communicate the Sikh infantry. (Kohli, 1970) All this altered completely when he joined parades and granted substantial support and prizes to them. (Kohli, 1970) How famous it had become can be traced out from the table. (Kohli, 1970)

Year	Strength of Infantry	Monthly Salary in Rupees
1819	7748	60172
1823	11681	84162
1828	15625	116284
1833	20577	167962
1838	26617	227660
1843	37791	483056
1845	53962	570205

It is said that each division contained on almost 800 men. He, with his vision and instinct in military elements, provided his solemn consideration to artillery. It was lucky for him that the Sikh soldiers did not have any sturdy hatred to artillery, as they had demonstrated at the time of registration of infantry. (Kohli, 1970) Since 1822, he engaged a number of Europeans to train his soldiers and be able to form the guns. In artillery, Alexander Gardner and Galud August Court were the most obvious. (Kohli, 1970) Similarly, there were many swivels and guns in the Sikh artillery, of which detail has been provided below. (Kohli, 1970)

Year	Strength	Swivels	Guns	Salary
1818-19	834	190	22	5840
1828-29	3778	280	130	28390
1838-39	4535	280	180	32906
1843-44	8280	300	282	82893
1845-46	10524	300	376	89251

Artillery divisions consisted of *Topkhana Jinsi*, *Gavi*, *Aspi* and *Hoboth*. There were also the *Zamburks* and *Ghumbaras*. (Kohli, 1970) The quantity of guns in a *Jinsi* battery was 10-25 or more, whilst a horse battery had 6-10 pieces. *Dera Zamburakkhana* consisted of about 60 swivels, yet, later on, their amount was reduced from 25 to 38. In Lahore, Ranjit Singh had a Foundry for forming the Guns. These guns were as good as utilized in the British armed force. It hesitated in our mind that the art of making the guns was innovative in the Punjab in the early 19th century. (Kohli, 1970) According to Barr.

The two guns on the right side of the battalion were six pounders, and were the similar that William Bentinck had offered to Ranjit Singh. The remaining were formed by himself and seemed nearly equal. They were very decent and all the blast was shaped of beaten iron whilst the price of each was one rupee. The majority of the ammunitions was collected with pewter, which he stated to us well. The men costume was approximately like the British artillery, but without helmets. They used to fasten red turbans which hang down to shelter the rear and cross belts; and a black leather cover with lengthy boots; black waist and black leather muffler. (Barr, 1970)

How much he succeeded in training of his army, Lafont demonstrated it in these words.

All the noblemen went at day interval to Ranjit's assessment, and returned back rather embarrassed. He had approximately numerous troops. They were relatively as well-organized rather healthier dressed, repeated the equal armed movements and some others more complex and in brief, nobody identifies what to say about it, so that they say nothing but that they are sure the Sikhs would retreat in a real combat. (Lafont, 1978)

Ranjit Singh exhibited his insightful sense in restructuring his cavalry. The majority of the Sikhs was basically soldiers and he saw no maltreatment among them to join his soldierly service. He kept his military in *Ghorcharas* as well as the consistent cavalry. (Kohli, 1970) The troops of the *Sardars of Kanhia* and *Nakkai Misl* were fascinated into the groups, which were controlled by the princes Sher Singh and Kharak Singh respectively. (Kohli, 1970) Though there was no fixed structure of regimentation in the grades of the *Deras*, yet some executive positions of the regular units, like Commander-in-Chief and Major, had been fascinated. To develop management and control in combat, the minor *Deras* were kept together and were positioned under the charge of an officer. (Kohli, 1970)

The *Jagirdari* cavalry was sustained on the feudal norm where each *Jagirdar* had to provide a definite number of well-resourced troops. Their number was resolute by the worth of their own *Jagirs*. These troops were staying on their *Jagirs* and each *Jagirdar* was bound to submit a vivid enrollment of all the figures of his dependent. The exercise of labeling the horses was familiarized and had to present them every year on the day of the *Doosehra* anniversary. A harsh assembly used to hold by Ranjit Singh in which the attendance of every person, from the highest officer to the usual soldier, was mandatory. (Kohli, 1970) Any breach of the principles resulted in instant chastisement. After the decline of Napoleon, two French officers, Captain Allard and Ventura, joined the *Maharaja's* service in 1822. They were to be well-organized on the similar lines as was the example of a cavalry unit in Europe. (Orlich, 1845) After examining the first qualified units, Ranjit Singh contented that the foreign officers would produce outcomes if they were granted large salaries.

Ranjit Singh had 52 European in his army such as English, Russian, Spanish, Greek, German, French and Austrian. Sixteen were French, in which General Ventura and General Allard were distinguished. These two were accountable for making *Fauj-e-Khas* which had completed many fruitful campaigns. (Lafont, 1978) Its noteworthy characteristics were to be ready for travelling at two days' notice with all its apparatuses at thrilling speed. Allard's Brigade contained on 3 regiments, while Ventura's on 5 divisions. (Lafont, 1978) Two others French Officers, Avitabile and Court, also joined Ranjit Singh's armed service. The Court was assigned the obligation to develop the artillery division. By 1830, the *Maharaja* had three developed and full-fledged Brigades. (Lafont, 1978)

In 1833, Ranjit Singh ordered to restructure his entire regular military on the pattern of *Fauj-e-Khas*. Observing such happenings, the British ordered their mediators to be attentive and detained any French military officer connected with the *Maharaja's* army. (Singh F. , 1964) Ventura and Allard had introduced the system of officers "*En pied*" and "*Ala Sui*" which had been introduced long ago in the French armed forces. Thus, the brigade,

whatsoever loss of officers, may survive in the field. (Singh F. , 1964) Due to these well-organized battalions, nothing could be measured in any field of life in the Punjab. At Ferozshah in 1846, these skilled battalions and brigades were handed over to the British armed forces. This was the only tragedy which they ever experienced. (Lafont, 1978)

4. CONCLUSION

Being a formidable man, Ranjit Singh only succeeded to seize Lahore in 1799, however, he consolidated his territories and set up himself as the widespread leader in the Punjab. Thus, he conquered the entire Punjab and inaugurated a Sikh dynasty which lasted for half of a century. His triumph over Multan finished Afghan's impact in the Punjab and broke the strong group of the Muslim States in the South. It also curbed the chiefs of Dera Ghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Bahawalpur and Mankera. Furthermore, it opened the way to Sindh. Notwithstanding all these soldierly and political favorable circumstances, Multan was a significant achievement.

REFERENCES

- Ali, S. (1847). *The Sikhs and the Afghans*. London: John Murray and Albemarle.
- Ali, S. (1848). *The History of Bahawalpur*. London: James Madden.
- Barr, W. (1970). *Journal of a March from Delhi to Kabul*. Patiala: Languages Department.
- Bhatia, H. (1992). *Rare Documents on Sikhs and their Rule in the Punjab*. New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications.
- Chughtai, D. A. (2000). *Lahore Sikhon Kay Aehd Main*. Lahore: Print Line Publishers.
- Durrani, D. A. (1981). *Multan under the Afghans 1752-1818*. Multan: Bazme Saqafat.
- Garrett, H. (1970). *Events at the Court of Ranjit Singh 1810-1817*. Patiala: Languages Department.
- Gilani, S. M. (1938). *Muraqqa-e-Mooltan*. Lahore: Jazib Publishers.
- Govt. of the Punjab. (1910). *Punjab District Gazetteers, Muzaffargarh District 1908 (Vols. XXXIV-A)*. Lahore: Govt. of the Punjab.
- Griffin, L. H. (1890). *The Punjab Chiefs: Historical and Biographical Notices of the Principal Families*. Lahore: Civil and Military Gazette Press.
- Griffin, L. H. (1893). *Rulers of India: Ranjit Singh*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Griffin, L. H. (1916). *Ranjit Singh and the Sikh Barrier between our Growing Empire and Central Asia*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Gupta, H. R. (1991). *History of the Sikhs: The Sikh Lion of Lahore Maharaja Ranjit Singh 1799-1839 (Vol. 5)*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers.
- Hasrat, B. (1977). *Life and Times of Ranjit: A Saga of Benevolent Despotism*. Hoshiarpur: V.V. Research Institute.
- Imperial Gazetteer of India. (1908). *Provincial Series Punjab (Vol. 1)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jafri, S. A. (n.d.). *Tarikh-e-Punjab*. Lahore: New Book Palace.
- Kansal, M. (1984). *Education during Ranjit Singh's Reign*. In F. Singh, *Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Politics, Society and Economy*. Patiala: Publication Bureau Punjab University.
- Kiernan, V. G. (1970). *Metcalfe's Mission to Lahore, 1808-1809*. Patiala: Languages Department.
- Kohli, S. R. (1970). *The Organization of the Khalsa Army, Maharaja Ranjit Singh First Death Century Memorial*. Patiala: Languages Department.
- Lafont, J. M. (1978). *French Administrators of Maharaja Ranjit Singh*. London: Oxford Univrsity.
- Latif, S. M. (1891). *History of the Punjab: From the Remotest antiquity to the Present Time*. Calcutta: Calcutta Central Press Company.
- Orlich, C. L. (1845). *Travels in India including Sindh and the Punjab (Vol. 1)*. London: Longman Brown.
- Prinsep, H. T. (1834). *Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab and Political Life of Muharaja Runjeet Singh*. Calcutta: G.H. Hutt Mann, Military Orphans Press.
- Sarkar, J. (1992). *Fall of the Mughal Empire (Vol. 4)*. Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar.
- Singh, A. (1992). *Military Campaigns of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and under His Successors*. PhD diss., : Panjab University Chandigarh.
- Singh, F. (1964). *Military System 1799-1849*. New Delhi: Moti Lal Banarsi Das Publishers.
- Singh, K. (1977). *A History of the Sikhs 1839-1947 (Vol. 2)*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Sinha, N. K. (1933). *Maharaja Ranjit Singh*. Calcutta: A Mukherjee Publication.